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Abstract 
 
The Economist and Kaspersky challenged us to design a blockchain system for digital 
voting.  In response, we propose three protocols, the Open Vote Network, DRE‐i and 
DRE‐ip, for solving this challenge. 
We demonstrate that the Open Vote Network, a decentralised Internet voting 
protocol, can be run over Ethereum’s blockchain today. Not only Ethereum can be 
used as a public bulletin board, but also it enforces the correct execution of the 
voting protocol.  However, the Open Vote Network is only suitable for small‐scale 
elections. For national elections, we present DRE‐i and DRE‐ip which both rely on a 
public bulletin board that can be realised using an Ethereum‐like blockchain.  
We improve trust in an election by removing trusted tallying authorities. While 
preserving the voter’s privacy, our protocols allow anyone, including observers, to 
verify the integrity of the election without having to trust authorities. This follows a 
similar philosophy as seen in crypto‐currencies such as Bitcoin which successfully 
removed the role of banks for maintaining a financial ledger.  
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"I consider it completely unimportant who in the party will vote, or how; but 
what is extraordinarily important is this — who will count the votes, and how." 
– Reported from Joseph Stalin [1] 
1. Introduction  
Paper-based voting 
In paper-based voting, tallying is a critical process where the winner of an election is 
determined. When a voter inserts the completed ballot into the box, they lose sight of the 
ballot and have to trust election authorities to faithfully record and tally ballots. But corrupted 
authorities may modify, miscount or exclude the voter’s ballot without the voter’s 
knowledge. The lack of assurance on the tallying integrity is one major cause for disputes in 
the aftermath of an election.  
Modern e-voting products 
In the modern digital era, e-voting products are being adopted by many countries to allow 
voters to cast ballots on a touch-screen direct-recording electronic (DRE) machine or over the 
Internet. Similar as before, voters have to trust election authorities to faithfully record and 
tally their electronic ballots. However, as compared with tampering with physical ballots, it is 
much easier for a single corrupted authority to tamper with the electronic records and tally.  
Academic research 
The state-of-the-art in the field of e-voting research concerns voting systems that are end-to-
end (E2E) verifiable [2]. Being E2E verifiable means that voters are able to verify if their 
votes are cast as intended, recorded as cast and tallied as recorded. As the verification covers 
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from the start of casting a vote to the end of receiving the tally, this gives the name “End-to-
End verifiable”. 
To mimic the role of trusted counting staff in paper-based voting, almost all of the E2E 
voting systems assume tallying authorities (TAs), who are trustworthy individuals with 
computing and cryptographic expertise tasked to perform the tallying operation. However, 
voters must trust the TAs do not collude all together, as then they can learn each individual 
vote. The fact that TAs have such power presents a deterring effect on some voters when 
choosing their favoured candidates.  
Our vision 
In our vision, we believe a future-generation e-voting system should be one that provides 
E2E verifiability without depending on any privileged group of people who act as tallying 
authorities. In other words, the system should be “self-enforcing”. This is highlighted in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of the Trust on Tallying Authorities 
 
Our confidence in the feasibility of this vision builds on several existing “self-enforcing” e-
voting protocols, namely Open Vote Network (OV-net) [3], Direct Recording Electronic 
with integrity (DRE-i) [5] and DRE-i with enhanced privacy (DRE-ip) [4]. OV-net is 
designed for small-scale boardroom voting, while DRE-i and DRE-ip are for national scale 
elections. 
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These protocols—in fact all verifiable e-voting protocols—require a public bulletin board 
where cryptographic data is published for public verification. The publication of data on the 
bulletin board must be append-only. If the previous audit data can be retrospectively 
modified, the assurance on the tallying integrity will be lost. 
A practical public bulletin board 
In this challenge, we investigate Bitcoin [6] and its underlying public ledger, the blockchain, 
to identify if it can be used as a public bulletin board for electronic voting. Bitcoin’s 
blockchain is immutable and censorship resistant which are desirable properties for an e-
voting public bulletin board. Unfortunately, it is only a global singleton database that can 
store data, and is limited in its support for programming capability, which is needed to 
enforce the execution of the voting protocol. 
Among several existing blockchain systems, we choose Ethereum’s blockchain [7] for the 
proof-of-concept implementation of our e-voting solution. Conceptually, Ethereum is a global 
singleton computer that can store and execute programs (‘smart contracts’). The execution 
transcripts of these contracts are stored in the blockchain and verified by Ethereum’s 
underlying peer-to-peer (P2P) network. This decentralised P2P network enforces the correct 
execution of the programs without involving trusted third parties, hence the Ethereum 
blockchain is also considered “self-enforcing”.  
In this report, we demonstrate a proof-of-concept implementation of OV-net [3], an efficient 
self-enforcing e-voting protocol, over Ethereum for the first time. 
2. Our Solution: Open Vote Network 
Open Vote Network is a decentralized two-round voting scheme [3]. For a single candidate 
election with the Yes/No choice, this protocol can be described as follows (for the multiple 
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candidate version see [3]).  First, all 𝑛 voters agree on (𝐺, 𝑔) where 𝐺 is a cyclic group of 
prime order 𝑞, and 𝑔 is a generator in 𝐺. Each voter 𝑃𝑖   chooses a secret value 𝑥𝑖 uniformly at 
random from [0, 𝑞 − 1]. 
Round 1: every voter Pi publishes 𝑔𝑥𝑖 and a Schnorr Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) for 
proving the knowledge of 𝑥𝑖. At the end of this round, every voter validates all ZKPs, and 
computes: 
𝑔𝑦𝑖 = ∏ 𝑔𝑥𝑗𝑗<𝑖 ∏ 𝑔
𝑥𝑗
𝑗>𝑖⁄ . 
Round 2: every voter Pi  publishes 𝑔𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑣𝑖 and a one-out-of-two ZKP for proving that 𝑣𝑖 is 
either 0 or 1 (for No and Yes respectively). At the end of this round, anyone who observes the 
protocol can tally the number of ones by computing: 
∏ 𝑔𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑖 𝑔
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑔∑ 𝑥𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑖 𝑔∑𝑖𝑣𝑖 = 𝑔∑𝑖𝑣𝑖. 
The above protocol works based on the cancellation of random factors at the tallying phase 
i.e., ∑ 𝑥𝑖 𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 0 where by the definition 𝑦𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑗<𝑖 −  ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑗>𝑖  (see Round 1). As an 
example, assume n = 4, the random factors will be cancelled as shown in Figure 2. From 
𝑔∑𝑖𝑣𝑖, anyone can compute the tally ∑𝑖𝑣 by exhaustive search. 
 
Figure 2: An example of random factor cancellation 
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This scheme assumes an authenticated public channel available for every voter. Using a 
public bulletin board is commonly suggested to realize such a channel. However, in practice, 
implementing such a secure bulletin board has remained a technical challenge. We believe 
the blockchain holds the key to this problem and will demonstrate the feasibility by 
presenting a concrete proof-of-concept implementation. 
3. The Proof-Of-Concept Implementation 
In our implementation, voters need to connect to Ethereum's underlying peer-to-peer (P2P) 
network as shown in Figure 3, and their identities are represented by Ethereum accounts. 
These accounts are simply public-private key pairs that have been locally generated on the 
voters’ machines, and should have a positive balance of ether (Ethereum's currency). The 
voter can compute a digital signature using their Ethereum account to prove the authenticity 
of data that they send during the voting process. 
 
Figure 3: How voters connect to Ethereum's underlying peer to peer network 
 
Implementation 
Our proof-of-concept implementation is written in Ethereum’s solidity language [8]. We have 
implemented the system’s user interface using HTML5 and JavaScript where it has three 
different views:  voter page, Election Authority page, and a live feed page (see Figures 7-10 
in Appendix for screenshot examples). These interfaces are designed to ease the interaction 
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between the voters, Election Authority and the Ethereum network while enabling them to 
observe the voting procedure.  
 
Figure 4: The Sequence diagram of our implementation 
 
The steps of the system are explained in Figure 4.  
 SETUP. The Election Authority establishes the list of eligible voters and informs 
Ethereum to transit to the signup phase. In addition to the election question, and in order 
to assure the voters that the election will happen in a timely manner, a list of start and end 
times for each phase is sent to the network too. 
 Register. The voter participates in the first round of OV-net by registering their ballots 
for the election. We have implemented Schnorr ZKP based on [9]. The registration ballot 
is accepted by the network once the ZKP is verified successfully. When the registration 
deadline is past, the Election Authority informs Ethereum to finish the registration phase. 
 COMPUTE. Ethereum computes each voter's voting key (i.e., 𝑔𝑦𝑖). Each voter can 
retrieve their voting key from Ethereum before casting their vote.  
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 COMMIT (Optional). The voter can send a 'commitment' of their encrypted vote to the 
Ethereum network. The commitment is a one-way hash of the round-2 message. Without 
this phase, in the second round of the protocol the final voter may privately compute the 
tally before sending their vote and this might influence the candidate they choose. 
Sending a 'commitment' is the equivalent to posting the vote in a sealed envelope to the 
network, and only revealing the votes once all sealed envelopes have arrived. 
 VOTE. The voter participates in the second round of OV-net by sending an encrypted 
vote and a one-out-of-two ZKP which we have implemented based on [19]. The vote is 
accepted into the blockchain only if the ZKP is verified successfully. 
 TALLY.  The tally is computed by the Ethereum network using the tally computation 
method defined in OV-net. 
Technicalities of the Ethereum platform  
During the implementation, we encountered several technical difficulties. 
First, Ethereum only supports 256-bit unsigned integers. For this reason, we chose to 
implement the protocol over an elliptic curve instead of a finite field. Unfortunately, Elliptic 
Curve cryptography is not natively supported yet and this required us to find an external 
library to perform the computation. This library must be stored in the blockchain alongside 
our program, which led to our initial voting contract being too large to store on the network. 
To resolve this issue, we had to separate our program into two smart contracts: one 'voting 
contract' for computing votes and verifying ZKPs and the other 'cryptography contract' for 
creating ZKPs (see Figure 12 in the Appendix). Note that any computation performed on 
Ethereum requires 'gas' which can be purchased using 'ether'.  Each block has a gas limit that 
corresponds to the maximum amount of computation allowed.  
Second, the call stack of a program has a hard-coded limit of 1024 stack frames [10]. This 
limits the amount of local memory available, and the number of function calls allowed. These 
limitations led to difficulty while implementing the 1-out-of-2 ZKP as the temporary 
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variables typically required exceeded the hard-coded limit. We had to use variables extremely 
sparingly to make the program work.  
Third, there exist few debugging tools for these smart contracts. The best practice is to create 
an ‘Event’ that logs data along with the contract. These events need to be incorporated into 
the program before compiling the contract, and they do not allow running the code step by 
step.  
Finally, the random numbers used for the ballot and casting the vote need to be stored on the 
voter's local machine. This is important to ensure that if the voter’s web browser crashes or is 
accidentally closed, then the random number is not lost. To this end, we built a standalone 
Java program that generates the random numbers on the voter’s local machine, and the voter 
is requested to upload those numbers as ‘voting code’ into the voting page.   
Cost analysis 
Our prototype of OV-net was tested using Ethereum’s official test network [7] with 40 voters 
to assess the cost of running an election. The voting and cryptography contracts cost £0.78 
and £0.50 respectively to store on the blockchain, and 125 Ethereum transactions (see Figure 
11 in the Appendix) to run the election with a total cost of £27.72. As shown in Figure 5, the 
average cost is £0.69 per voter, which is lower than the typical cost of running a paper-based 
election (see Appendix: Table 3 for a detailed breakdown of cost and Table 4 for 
comparisons with the reported costs in real-world elections). The most expensive operations 
include the voter registering their ballot (£0.14, i.e., 15% of a block’s available gas) and 
casting their vote (£0.49, i.e., 53% of a block’s available gas). This suggests that within one 
block (generated approximately every 12 seconds) only six voters can register for the 
election, and only one vote can be cast per block using the current Ethereum network.  
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Figure 5: The cost of voting using our system 
4. Scaling Up to National Elections 
Scaling up our solution to national elections requires addressing limitations in both 
Ethereum's blockchain and the e-voting protocol. 
First, using Ethereum as deployed today, only one vote can be cast in one block. Given that 
each block is generated every 12 seconds, this means only five votes per minute can be cast 
over the blockchain. Take the 2011 UK Referendum an example. For 5.2 million votes (the 
number of postal votes in that election), it would require 722 days for all votes to be recorded 
into Ethereum’s blockchain.  
To support national scale elections, a dedicated Ethereum-like blockchain will be required. 
Such a blockchain will provide a consistent global database that all voters have access to and 
guarantee that all inserted data remain immutable. Election audit data sent to the blockchain 
will be verified by independent validators who act as 'miners' and get awarded for verifying 
the audit data and maintaining the blockchain. Each block should allow storing more votes by 
increasing the gas limit and new blocks may be generated at a faster speed than the current 12 
seconds per block. 
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Second, another limitation concerns the e-voting protocol. OV-net is decentralized and is 
designed only for small-scale boardroom voting [3]. To support national-scale elections, we 
propose using DRE-i [5] and DRE-ip [4], which follow a similar “self-enforcing” idea as the 
Open Vote Network but use a centralised voting facility (either a web server or a DRE 
machine) to directly record votes from the voter (without knowing the voter’s real identity, 
which can be ensured through physical or procedural means [4,5]). For both DRE-i and DRE-
ip the centralised facilities need to connect to the Ethereum network, as shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: How DRE-i and DRE-ip connect to the Ethereum network 
 
Due to the space limit, we only briefly describe DRE-i [5] and DRE-ip [4]. Both protocols are 
E2E verifiable voting protocols designed for supporting large-scale elections without tallying 
authorities. The difference between the two is that DRE-i pre-computes the encrypted ballots 
before the election while DRE-ip computes the encrypted ballots in real time during voting. 
The pre-computation has the advantage of minimizing the latency in voting, which makes 
DRE-i a suitable choice for Internet voting since the server must be able to handle many 
simultaneous vote submissions. By contract, DRE-ip does not perform pre-computation and 
hence removes the need to securely store the pre-computed ballots. The protocol provides 
strong guarantee on the vote privacy in the sense that when the DRE machine is completely 
compromised, the information leakage is minimal as only the partial tally is revealed. These 
properties make DRE-ip a suitable choice for polling station voting.  
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5. Meeting the Challenge's Criteria  
As summarized in Table 1, OV-net satisfies four out of the five criteria set by Kaspersky. The 
only exception is that it does not prevent voting under duress. This is because voting happens 
in an unsupervised environment and the voter is not guaranteed a private moment to cast 
their vote. This can be addressed by implementing e-voting under a supervised environment 
at polling stations using DRE-ip; a private moment of voting is assured by the use of a private 
voting booth. OV-net provides the maximum protection on voter privacy as only a full-
collusion that involves all other voters can reveal the vote [3]. The tallying process 
guarantees that all votes stored on Ethereum's blockchain are included in the final tally, 
which everyone can compute. The tally is only computable when the final vote has been cast, 
which effectively hides interim results. Finally, the protocol allows easily adding an 'abstain' 
option as an additional candidate choice for undecided voters. 
Table 1:  Open Vote Network vs. challenge's criteria 
Criteria  The Open Vote Network 
Voter privacy and the 
ability to count votes 
All voters must collude to reveal an individual vote, and the 
system is self-tallying without needing any trusted tallying 
authorities. 
Problem of voting 
under duress 
Voter has no private moment, and coercion is possible. 
Availability of interim 
results 
No interim results available; tally computable only when 
the last vote is cast. 
Undecided Voters Voter has the option to register for election; empty votes 
cannot be casted; cast votes cannot be modified and voters 
can select ‘abstain’. 
The voting aftermath Dispute-free; all election data is publicly verifiable. 
 
In our analysis, we identify three different voting settings: decentralized Internet voting, 
centralized Internet voting and centralized polling station voting. Accordingly, we present 
a solution for each of these settings. Our three solutions cover all election scenarios that we 
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know of today. All our solutions allow voters to verify the tallying integrity without having to 
trust TAs, while the blockchain self-enforces the execution of the voting protocol. As 
compared with existing voting methods in real-world elections, our solutions provide 
compelling benefits in terms of voter verifiability and assurance on the tallying integrity, as 
summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2: Summary of comparison on verifiability and tallying integrity 
 Decentralized 
remote voting 
Centralized remote 
voting 
Centralized polling station voting 
Schemes Open Vote 
network 
DRE-i Postal DRE-ip Paper DRE DRE with 
paper 
audit trail 
Voter can 
verify if vote 
is cast as 
intended 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ 
Voter can 
verify if the 
cast vote is 
recorded 
✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ 
Voter can 
verify if votes 
are tallied as 
recorded 
✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ 
Assurance on 
tallying 
integrity when 
TAs are all 
corrupted 
✔ ✔ ✘ ✔ ✘ ✘ ✘ 
Suitable 
election 
Small- 
scale 
Large- 
scale 
Large- 
scale 
Large- 
scale 
Large- 
scale 
Large- 
scale 
Large-
scale 
6. Conclusion 
The Economist and Kaspersky challenged us to build secure digital voting using the 
blockchain. We found motivation from the realm of cryptocurrencies that has so far 
successfully removed the need to trust a central bank or institution to maintain a financial 
ledger. In this challenge, we proposed to remove trusted tallying authority from the election 
process. To accomplish this goal, we built a prototype of the Open Vote Network protocol 
and demonstrate that it is a practical solution that works on Ethereum today. The role of 
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Ethereum is not limited to a simple public bulletin board, but also to enforce the correct 
execution of the voting protocol.  
Two further protocols DRE-i and DRE-ip are described to demonstrate that our approach can 
scale up to a national election. Most importantly, all solutions are fully verifiable and provide 
a strong guarantee on the integrity of the tallying results – and by doing so, preserving the 
integrity of democracy.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Voter page, Login to the Ethereum 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Voter Page, The election results 
 
 
Figure 9: Election Authority page: Setting up the list of eligible voters 
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Figure 10: The Live Feed page showing voting in progress 
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Figure 11: The transaction page of a sample election over Ethereum 
(https://testnet.etherscan.io/address/0xa1bb838dc6a4b5e96405b1e44f38c57ac39f5249) 
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Figure 12: The transaction information of voting contract 
(https://testnet.etherscan.io/tx/0xe91075e4248c61b97125acb7ff09deb2099f646202c269d9bd61fa4
ea1ba5dea) 
 
Table 3: Cost of 40 voters participating in the Open Vote Network 
Stages Gas per 
voter 
Total Gas Ether per 
voter 
Total 
Ether 
Cost per 
voter (£) 
Total Cost 
(£) 
Eligible 53,840 2,153,610 
 
0.0010768 0.0430722 0.010768 0.430722 
Transition to 
SIGNUP 
0 198,629 0 0.00397258 0 0.0397258 
Register 743,323 29,732,914 0.01486646 0.59465828 0.1486646 5.9465828 
Transition to 
COMPUTE 
0 27,162 0 0.00054324 0 0.0054324 
Compute 77,479 3,099,151 0.00154958 0.06198302 0.0154958 0.6198302 
Commit 70,121 2,804,850 0.00140242 0.056097 0.0140242 0.56097 
Vote 2,496,704 99,868,143 0.04993408 1.99736286 0.4993408 19.9736286 
Tally 18,243 729,709 0.000364855 0.01459418 0.00364854 0.1459418 
Total 3,441,467 139,330,329 0.06882934 2.78660658 £0.69 £27.72 
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Table 4: Comparison of cost with existing voting systems 
Location Type of Election Cost per Registered Voter Election Title/Year 
UK Wide 
[11] 
Paper Based £3.01 UK 
Referendum/2011 
California 
[12] 
Paper/DRE with paper 
trail[17] 
$2.77 General 
Election/2014 
Colorado [13] Mail[17] $6.04 General 
Election/2014 
North Dakota 
[14] 
Paper Based[17] $4.30 General 
Election/2014 
Wisconsin 
[15] 
Paper/DRE with paper 
trail[17] 
$19.10 ($3.19 if all registrants 
showed up) 
General 
Election/2014 
India [16] Electronic Voting 
Machines (EMVs) [18] 
17 INR (about $0.25) General 
Election/2009 
Open Vote 
Network 
Decentralized internet 
voting 
£0.67  Trial election over 
Ethereum/2016 
 
